Has Iran passed the nuclear threshold? Has the US betrayed Israel with Iran? What is the path forward for Israel with Washington? In this week’s Caroline Glick Show, Caroline was joined by Dr. David Wurmser from the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC. Glick and Wurmser discussed reports that the Biden administration is rushing to reach a deal with Iran that will legitimize Iran’s status as a nuclear armed state. Wurmser explained why IAEA’s politically driven decision to close to investigations into Iran’s illicit nuclear operations signal the death knell of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and America’s position as the preeminent superpower in the Middle East. And the two explored Israel’s options moving forward with Washington now all-but-openly hostile to its most basic national interests.
- IAEA 60 percent suffices to create a relatively compact nuclear explosive; further enrichment to 80 or 90 percent is not needed”. A common fallacy is Iran would require 90 percent HEU, more commonly called weapon-grade uranium, to build nuclear explosives. Although Iran’s nuclear weapons designs have focused on 90 percent HEU and likely prefer that enrichment, modifying them for 60 percent HEU would be straightforward and well within Iran’s capabilities. 60 percent suffices to create a relatively compact nuclear explosive; further enrichment to 80 or 90 percent is not needed. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 41.7 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium (uranium mass) is a significant quantity, which the IAEA defines as the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive. Will any news service report the truth ? SEE INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ONLINE REPORT “Entering Dangerous, Uncharted Waters: Iran’s 60 Percent Highly Enriched Uranium By David Albright and Sarah Burkhard April 11, 2022”
- Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency 2023, United Nations’ top nuclear official, Iran has enough highly enriched uranium to build “several” nuclear weapons if it chooses,
Amad Plan Revival
Iran could revive and complete the Amad Plan, creating an industrial-scale nuclear weapons production complex able to serially produce nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles and perhaps cruise missiles. The Amad Plan was well structured, with hundreds of well-defined tasks, each with a schedule, along with careful tracking of progress and shortcomings of each task. By late 2003, and the halt of the Amad Plan, most tasks associated with nuclear weaponization were completed or well on their way to completion, the organizational hierarchy was set, needed physical infrastructure mapped out, and large-scale facilities designed or under construction.
- Iran threatens the world with a program ready to produce nuclear weapons “on-demand.” Its readiness program poses a difficult challenge to the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- Due to its past, large-scale nuclear weapons program, called the Amad Plan, Iran has a readiness program with less need for secret nuclear weapon development activities. Iran has advanced its nuclear weapons readiness under civilian nuclear and military non-nuclear cover projects. Using a civilian cover, Iran has in recent years successfully produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) and near HEU metal.
MARCH 2023 IAEA FINDINGS ● IRAN CAN NOW BREAK OUT AND PRODUCE ENOUGH WEAPON-GRADE ENRICHED URANIUM FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPON IN 12 DAYS, USING ONLY THREE ADVANCED CENTRIFUGE CASCADES AND HALF OF ITS EXISTING STOCK OF 60 PERCENT ENRICHED URANIUM.
ANALYSIS OF IAEA IRAN VERIFICATION AND MONITORING REPORT – FEBRUARY 2023 BY DAVID ALBRIGHT, SARAH BURKHARD, SPENCER FARAGASSO, AND ANDREA STRICKER MARCH 3, 2023 INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY :
This information is from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) quarterly report for February 28, 2023, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
This breakout could be difficult for inspectors to detect promptly, if Iran took steps to delay inspectors’ access. ● Using its remaining stock of 60 percent enriched uranium and its stock of near 20 percent enriched uranium, Iran could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for an additional four nuclear weapons in a month. During the next two months, Iran could produce two more weapons’ worth of weapon-grade uranium from its stock of less than five percent enriched uranium, meaning that Iran could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for five nuclear weapons in one month and seven in three months. ● The IAEA detected uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent from environmental sampling taken during a monthly interim verification (IIV) at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on January 22. Iran’s answers about this anomaly did not satisfy the IAEA, which has continued probing Iran for more credible answers. ● The IAEA took the environmental samples that detected the presence of near-84 percent enriched uranium a day after inspectors detected an undeclared interconnection between two IR-6 cascades at Fordow, which Iran should have informed the IAEA about under its safeguards obligations. That change likely led the IAEA to take environmental samples at the product sampling point. ● This development amplifies concerns that Iran is undertaking covert experiments that add to its ability to more rapidly break out. Worrisome possibilities include that Iran tested a way to produce near weapon-grade uranium without IAEA detection, or to syphon off a small amount of near 84 percent enriched uranium.
PLUTONIUM : Iran Arak Nuclear Complex – IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor. The importance of heavy water to a nuclear proliferator is that it provides one more route to produce plutonium for use in weapons, entirely bypassing uranium enrichment and all of the related technological infrastructure. In addition, heavy-water-moderated reactors can be used to make tritium. Heavy water is the key to one type of reactor in which plutonium can be bred from natural uranium. As such, the production of heavy water has always been monitored, and the material is export controlled. In addition, a source of deuterium is essential for the production of tritium and LiD, two ingredients of thermonuclear weapons.
Arak was thought to be able to produce around 9kg of weapons-grade Plutonium annually. However, in order to retrieve this material, Iran needs a spent fuel processing facility, which it is believe Iran does not have. But there is no way to prove Tehran does not have this capability.
In February of 2016, Iran exceeded its allowed limit of stockpiled Heavy Water for the first time. It exceeded the limit once again on November 9th of 2016 . Iran has also transferred over 80 metric tons of Heavy Water, initially intended to be used at Arak, to Oman. But it is guarded by the IRGC in Oman.
IAEA REPORT 25 November 2021 Since 23 February 2021, Iran has neither informed the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), 20 nor allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15).